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Security

Content Security Policy, HTML and URL handling, personal data in AI requests, GoTipe Cloud's protections, and how to report a vulnerability.

This page lists what GoTipe does to keep untrusted content inert and what your application still owns: storage, credentials, network access and the policies of your pages.

Content Security Policy

The JS engine and PageEditor work under a strict policy. This one is tested with the library in a separate production build:

Text
default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self';
object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'
Directive Why
script-src 'self' Enough for the JS engine: no eval, no workers, no WASM. Import from @gotipe/core/js (or alias @gotipe/core to it) so the bundle has no WASM at all.
script-src 'wasm-unsafe-eval' Needed for the WASM engine, real-time collaboration and PDF/DOCX export.
style-src 'unsafe-inline' The editor sets style attributes: menu and cursor positions, colors, cell alignment.
img-src data: Images uploaded without host storage, and those your resolveAsset returns, are data: URLs.
font-src The theme declares no @font-face; it uses the fonts in --gt-font-ui and --gt-font-mono.
connect-src The editor makes no requests of its own. Add your Cloud API, wss: sync host and AI endpoints.

GoTipe never widens a policy for you. A development server with hot reload is no proof that a production build passes; test the built pages.

HTML input and output

No GoTipe package inserts an HTML string into the page. HTML that comes in — pasted content and setContent(html) — is parsed with DOMParser into a detached document and converted to blocks from an allowlist of elements. <script>, <style>, <iframe>, <object>, <embed>, <template>, <noscript> and form inputs are dropped; only known inline formats, safe links, safe image sources and safe colors survive.

HTML that goes out — exportToHtml, serializeHtml, renderToHtml — is built from the document structure with escaped text and validated URLs and colors. The one exception is the blockRenderers option of renderToHtml: their HTML is inserted as you return it.

  • toSafeHref(href) from @gotipe/core accepts http:, https:, mailto: and relative URLs. It removes whitespace and control characters before reading the scheme, so a javascript: scheme split by a tab or a line break is rejected too.
  • Image sources also accept base64 data: URLs of PNG, JPEG, GIF and WebP; SVG and other data: types are rejected.
  • toSafeColor(value) accepts hex colors, color names and rgb()/hsl() values, and rejects anything else, such as url() or var().
  • Links never navigate on a plain click. Cmd/Ctrl+click, or any click in read-only mode, goes to host.openLink; without a host the editor opens the URL with noopener,noreferrer. An unsafe URL reports a LINK_BLOCKED error instead.
  • Uploaded images must be PNG, JPEG, GIF or WebP. A javascript: or vbscript: URL returned by host.saveAsset is refused. Without host storage, files up to 10 MiB are embedded as data: URLs; your host owns storage, access control and the URLs resolveAsset returns.

Exports and migration

PDF and DOCX export never fetch URLs, read files, discover system fonts or run code from the document. Images come from your resolveImage callback, which owns credentials and access checks; decoding is limited in size and memory. Headers and footers are plain text. Unknown blocks, marks and unsafe links fail the export instead of passing through. The migration converters never load URLs or parse HTML.

AI and personal data

@gotipe/ai has no network client: your AiProvider decides where text goes. Keep provider keys on a server — the Cloud AI endpoint is one such proxy.

With enablePiiDetection: true (off by default), the AI extension refuses to send a prompt or context that contains an email address, a phone number of 10 or more digits, or a card number that passes the Luhn check. It blocks the request with an error rather than redacting text, so document positions stay valid. detectPii(text) runs the same check:

pii.ts
import { detectPii } from "@gotipe/ai";

const matches = detectPii("Write to ada@example.com or call +1 415 555 0100.");
// [{ pii_type: "Email", start: 9, end: 24, matched_text: "ada@example.com" },
//  { pii_type: "Phone", start: 33, end: 48, matched_text: "+1 415 555 0100" }]

It is a guard for common patterns, not a privacy classifier: names, addresses and other identifiers pass. The Cloud AI endpoint does not run it.

GoTipe Cloud

  • Passwords are checked against bcrypt hashes. API keys are stored as SHA-256 hashes and shown once.
  • Access tokens are ES256 JWTs; issuer, audience, expiry, token ID and subject are all checked. Revocation fails closed: when Valkey is unreachable, requests with access tokens answer 503.
  • Every route checks its scope, then the user's role on the document. A document you cannot access answers 404, as if it did not exist.
  • /sync takes the credential in a WebSocket subprotocol, never in the URL, re-checks access every 15 seconds and on every message, and accepts only exact origins.
  • CORS allows exact origins only. REST responses carry Content-Security-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, X-Frame-Options: DENY and a referrer policy.
  • Rate limits, body size limits and idempotency keys bound repeated and oversized requests.
  • Object storage stays private; exports are downloaded through signed URLs valid for an hour.
  • Stripe webhooks are verified by signature before they are stored.
  • The audit log records document, comment, version, permission, API key, export, organization and billing actions with the user and the client address. It is kept 90 days for accounts on the free plan. Request logs record the method, path, status, latency, request ID and client address, never query strings or credentials.

Before you expose a deployment

Warning:

The defaults are not safe for a public deployment until you go through this list.

  • Set HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS and SYNC_ALLOWED_ORIGINS to your own origins; the production defaults and the compose file name GoTipe's domains.
  • Keep Valkey on maxmemory-policy noeviction, as the stock infra/valkey/valkey.conf does: an evicting policy can drop token revocations and idempotency keys.
  • /readyz is public and reports each dependency only as ok or unavailable. Keep the metrics port (9090) and the monitoring profile's Prometheus and Grafana (admin password admin unless GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD is set) off the public network.
  • The login limit counts each client address. Behind your own reverse proxy, list it in TRUSTED_PROXIES; otherwise every client shares the proxy's limit. The compose stack's Caddy forwards only the client it resolved; put a CDN in front of it into Caddy's trusted_proxies, not into TRUSTED_PROXIES.

Report a vulnerability

Email security@gotipe.com. Do not open a public issue for a security problem.

Phase Target
Acknowledgment Within 24 hours
Assessment Within 72 hours
Fix Within 7 days for critical issues, 30 days for medium and low
Disclosure After the fix is released

In scope: the Rust crates, the TypeScript packages, the Cloud server and the infrastructure files in the repository. Out of scope: third-party dependencies (report them upstream), the documentation site and social engineering. SECURITY.md in the repository is the policy of record.